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The Impact of New Economic 
Information on the Volatility 
Of  Short-Term Interest Rates 
By  V. Vance Roley and Rick Troll 
The  sharp  rise  in  the  volatility  of  interest 
rates since late 1979 is widely recognized. One 
factor contributing to the increase in volatility 
may have been the Federal Reserve's change in 
its monetary-control procedures on October 6, 
1979.  Until then, the Federal Reserve focused 
on the control of short-term interest rates in an 
effort to achieve monetary growth objectives. 
Since late 1979, however, it has focused on the 
availability of reserves to financial institutions.' 
As  a  consequence,  short-term  interest  rates 
have been allowed to vary over a wider range 
than they were before. It is not surprising, then, 
that short-run movements in interest rates have 
been more pronounced. 
A previous article in  this Review examined 
the effect of the change in the Federal Reserve's 
operating  procedures  on  interest-rate 
For descriptions of the operating procedures adopted by 
the Federal Reserve on October 6, 1979 and comparisons 
with  the previous approach, see J. A. Cacy, "Monetary 
Policy  in  1980  and  1981,"  Economic  Review,  Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, December 1980, pp. 18-25, 
and Board  of  Governors of  the Federal  Reserve System, 
"Monetary Policy Objectives for 1981," February 1981. 
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v~latility.~  That article focused on the increase 
since October  1979 in  fluctuations in  interest 
rates  following  weekly  announcements  of 
changes  in  the  money  supply.  These  an- 
nouncements,  which  are made by the Federal 
Reserve every Friday, provide new information 
about  money  supply  developments  that  par- 
ticipants in financial markets use in adjusting 
their assessments of the current availability of 
reserves, the future course of monetary policy, 
and  possibly inflation.  For  example,  the  an- 
nouncement of a larger than anticipated change 
in the money supply may lead market  partic- 
ipants  to  expect  a  change  in  the  Federal 
Reserve's  monetary policy that will  affect in- 
terest  rates.  In  anticipating  the  change  in 
policy, market participants may then take ac- 
tions that lead immediately to movements in in- 
terest rates. 
The previous article found that the change in 
operating  procedures  had  contributed  to the 
rise in interest-rate volatility because the change 
V.  Vance  Roley, "Weekly  Money  Supply  Announce- 
ments and the Volatility  of Short-Term  Interest  Rates," 
Economic Review, Federal  Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
April 1982, pp. 3-15. For a more technical analysis, see V. 
Vance Roley, "The Response of Short-Term Interest Rates 
to Weekly Money Announcements," Working  Paper No. 
1001,  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  October 
1982. 
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more to a given money supply announcement. 
This article extends the previous analysis by ex- 
amining the impact on interest-rate volatility of 
factors in addition to money supply announce- 
ments, such as new  information on economic 
performance and announcements of changes in 
the  Federal Reserve's  discount  rate.  Also, in 
contrast to the previous study, which focused 
on  interest-rate  volatility  immediately  after 
money supply announcements,  this article ex- 
amines the impact on total interest-rate volatil- 
ity. 
The first section discusses alternative theories 
relating to the effects of new  economic infor- 
mation  on  short-term  interest  rates.  The 
volatility of  announced changes in money, in- 
flation,  and  economic  activity,  and  the 
associated  interest-rate  volatility  before  and 
after October 1979, are discussed in the second 
section. The third section empirically examines 
the relationship between announced changes in 
money,  inflation,  and  economic activity and 
fluctuations in interest rates to determine if in- 
creases in the responses to these announcements 
have significantly contributed to the rise in total 
interest-rate volatility. The main conclusions of 
the article are summarized in the final section. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC INFORMATION AND 
INTEREST RATES 
In discussing theories about the relationship 
between  interest  rate  movements  and  new 
economic information, this section first reviews 
the usual rationale for the positive relationship 
between  interest  rates  and  unanticipated  an- 
nounced changes in the money supply found in 
other  studies. Then, the effect of  announced 
changes in the discount rate on short-term in- 
terest rates is considered. Finally, the possible 
effects of  data announcements concerning in- 
flation and economic activity are discussed. 
Money supply announcements 
Announcements  of  larger  than  anticipated 
increases  in  the  money  supply  have  been 
observed to result in increases in short-term in- 
terest rates. The most frequent explanation of 
this positive relationship is based on the notion 
that the change reflects market participants' an- 
ticipations of  both current and future Federal 
Reserve  action^.^ Because market yields already 
reflect  expectations  of  future  announced 
changes in money, and hence the future course 
of Federal Reserve actions, only unanticipated 
changes in the money supply should affect in- 
terest  rates  after  a  money  supply announce- 
ment. If the announced money supply is greater 
than  anticipated,  for  example,  market  par- 
ticipants may expect higher short-term interest 
rates if they believe the Federal Reserve will at- 
tempt  to offset  the increase by  reducing the 
growth  of  bank  reserves.  Because  of  this 
changed  assessment, market  participants'  ac- 
tions  will  cause interest  rates  to increase im- 
mediately. 
Even if market participants do not expect the 
growth of bank reserves to slow in response to 
an unanticipated increase in the money supply, 
short-term interest rates may nevertheless rise 
under  a  reserve-aggregate  approach  to 
monetary control. Because of the lagged reserve 
accounting framework the Federal Reserve uses 
3 Jacob Grossman, "The Rationality of Money Supply Ex- 
pectations and the Short-Run Response of Interest Rates to 
Monetary  Surprises,"  Journal  of  Money,  Credit,  and 
Banking, November 1981, pp. 409-24; Thomas Urich and 
Paul  Wachtel, "Market  Response to  the  Weekly  Money 
Supply Announcement in the 1970s," Journal of Finance, 
December 1981, pp. 1063-72; and Thomas Urich, "The In- 
formation  Content  of  Weekly  Money  Supply  An- 
nouncements,"  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics,  July 
1982, pp. 73-88. For an alternative view stressing the role of 
expected inflation, see Bradford Cornell, "Money Supply 
Announcements  and  Interest  Rates:  Another  View," 
Working  Paper  No. 1-82,  Graduate  School of Manage- 
ment, University of California at Los Angeles, March 1982. 
4  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in imposing reserve requirements,  the current 
demand for reserves depends on deposits in the 
statement  week  ending on Wednesday of  the 
previous  week.  Thus,  announcement  of  a 
higher than expected change in the money supp- 
ly may cause investors to increase their assess- 
ment of the aggregate demand for reserves. In 
turn, if  investors expect the supply of reserves 
to remain unchanged for the rest of the current 
statement week, short-term interest rates will be 
expected to rise to equilibrate supply and de- 
mand in the reserve market.4 
Discount rate announcements 
Another  announcement  related  to Federal 
Reserve policy involves changes in the discount 
rate.  Under  the  pre-October  1979  operating 
procedures,  discount  rate  changes  typically 
lagged  behind  market  yields.  Moreover,  the 
federal funds rate-which  the Federal Reserve 
influenced  in  implementing  monetary 
policy-conveyed more timely signals about the 
current interest-rate implications of  monetary 
policy. 
In principle, the discount rate becomes more 
important  in  implementing  monetary  policy 
under  the  reserve-aggregate  approach  to 
monetary  control  adopted  in  October  1979.' 
Changes in the discount rate may have an im- 
mediate effect on short-term interest rates. This 
4 Carl  E.  Walsh, "The Effects of  Alternative Operating 
Procedures on  Economic and  Financial  Relationships," 
Research Working Paper No. 82-08, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City, September 1982. 
5 See, for example, Gordon H. Sellon, Jr., "The Role of 
the  Discount  Rate  in  Monetary  Policy:  A  Theoretical 
Analysis," Economic  Review,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas City, June 1980, pp. 3-15; and Gordon H. Sellon, 
Jr., and  Diane  Seibert, "The  Discount  Rate: Experience 
Under  Reserve  Targeting,"  Economic  Review,  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of Kansas City,  September/October 1982, 
pp. 3-18. 
is because the incentive for depository institu- 
tions to meet their reserve needs at the discount 
window depends importantly on the spread be- 
tween the federal funds rate and the discount 
rate.  Under  the  lagged  reserve  accounting 
system,  depository  institutions'  demand  for 
reserves in the current week is essentially fixed. 
The Federal Reserve then determines the mix 
between reserves supplied through open market 
operations-nonborrowed  reserves-and  re- 
serves supplied through the discount window. 
To the extent that the Federal  Reserve main- 
tains its nonborrowed reserve objective, an in- 
crease in  the  discount  rate initially creates  a 
disincentive for depository institutions to bor- 
row at the discount window. Since the supply of 
nonborrowed  reserves is fixed,  depository  in- 
stitutions seeking to meet their reserve needs in 
the federal funds ,market drive the funds rate 
up.  Under these circumstances, the funds rate 
and other short-term interest rates move with a 
change in the discount rate. 
Inflation announcements 
At  least  three  channels  may  link  an- 
nouncements of inflation data, such as changes 
in the consumer (CPI) and producer (PPI) in- 
dexes,  to  movements  on  short-term  interest 
rates.  First, if  the indexes are higher than an- 
ticipated,  market participants may revise their 
assessments of  current  inflation  upward  and 
lenders, in turn, may demand an increased in- 
flation premium to restore the real, or inflation 
adjusted,  return  on  loans  to previous  rates. 
Thus, any rise in expected inflation may cause 
nominal interest rates to rise.6 
Second,  if  the  announced  inflation  level 
6  For further discussion of this effect, see Thomas Urich 
and Paul Wachtel, "The Effects of Inflation and Money 
Supply  Announcements  on  Interest  Rates,"  mirneo, 
Graduate School  of Business Administration, New  York 
University, August 1982. 
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flation,  market  participants  may  also  revise 
their assessments of the current and future de- 
mand for money.  This result may follow be- 
cause the demand for nominal money balances 
depends on the price level.'  In turn, under the 
reserve-aggregate approach  to monetary  con- 
trol, any change in the forecast of  money de- 
mand  has immediate implications for interest 
rates. For example, an increase in the expected 
demand  for  nominal  money  balances due  to 
higher  expected  inflation  may  cause  market 
participants to increase their assessments of the 
future demand for bank reserves. Interest rates 
may then rise to equilibrate the demand for and 
supply of reserves. Under the pre-October 1979 
operating procedures, short-run fluctuations in 
money demand were typically at least partially 
offset, implying that unanticipated announced 
changes  in  inflation  should  have  been 
associated  with  somewhat  more  moderate 
short-run movements in interest rates. 
Third,  if  market  participants  think  the 
Federal Reserve responds directly to inflation, 
there may be another channel in which interest 
rates  respond  to  unanticipated  announced 
changes  in  inflation.  If  the  Federal  Reserve 
reacts to price  data as  well  as  money supply 
data, unanticipated changes in inflation could 
be associated with movements in short-term in- 
terest rates. This channel would appear to have 
been potentially more prevalent under the pre- 
October 1979 policy regime, since the emphasis 
on monetary control appeared to be somewhat 
less than in the three years since. 
Economic activity announcements 
Unanticipated  announced  changes  in 
economic activity, such as announcements of 
See,  for example, Stephen M. Goldfeld, "The Demand 
for Money Revisited," Brookings Papers on Economic Ac- 
tivity, No. 3, 1973, pp. 577-638. 
the unemployment rate and industrial produc- 
tion, may have both indirect and direct effects 
on interest rates. In terms of a possible indirect 
effect, announcements  that cause investors to 
reassess the current and future strength of the 
economy may, in  turn, cause market  partici- 
pants to revise their assessment of the current 
and future demand  for money, as money de- 
mand is thought to vary positively with real in- 
come.  Unanticipated  increases in  real activity 
may  be  associated  with  higher interest  rates, 
then, if  investors increase their assessments of 
the  future  demand  for  bank  reserves.  As 
before,  this  effect  could  be  more  prevalent 
under  the  reserve-aggregate  approach  to 
monetary control. 
Directly,  interest  rates  may  change  in 
response to unanticipated  announced  changes 
in  economic  activity  if  market  participants 
think  the Federal  Reserve  reacts to such  an- 
nounced  changes.  If  Federal  Reserve  policy 
changes in  response  to new  information  not 
only about the money supply  but also about 
economic activity, interest rates may move im- 
mediately on release of  the new  information. 
Again,  this  channel  appears  more  plausible 
under the pre-October 1979 policy regime. 
Effects of the change in 
operating procedures 
In  the  previous  study,  the  October  1979 
change in operating procedures was found to 
coincide with a sharp increase in the respon- 
siveness of  short-term  interest  rates  to unan- 
ticipated announced changes in the money sup- 
ply. In terms of announcements concerning dis- 
count rate changes, inflation, and economic ac-  . 
tivity, only changes in the discount rate should 
have  had  unambiguously  larger  effects  since 
October  1979. If  market  participants use new 
information about inflation and economic ac- 
tivity to infer changes in the demand for money 
and  hence the demand  for bank  reserves and 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City future Federal Reserve actions, the interest-rate 
response to these announcements may have also 
increased since October 1979.  However, if  the 
Federal Reserve reacted directly to the new in- 
formation before October 1979 but not after- 
ward,  the  response  of  short-term  rates  may 
have  diminished.  Thus,  interest-rate  fluctua- 
tions in response to these announcements may 
have contributed to the rise in the volatility of 
interest rates since October 1979, or they may 
have detracted from the rise. 
VOLATILITY OF ANNOUNCEMENTS AND 
SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES 
SINCE 1977 
This section examines the performances  of 
economic data announcements and short-term 
interest rates over the last five years. Market ex- 
pectations taken from a survey are then used to 
construct  a  series  representing  the  market's 
forecast error associated with each announce- 
ment. As discussed in the previous section, the 
forecast  error,  or  surprise,  is  pivotal  in 
estimating  the market's  response to any par- 
ticular announced measure of economic perfor- 
mance. 
Volatility of economic 
data announcements 
The  volatility  of  announced  measures  of 
economic performance were compared for two 
periods. The first period begins on September 
29,  1977,  the day the survey discussed  below 
was initiated, and ends on October 5, 1979, the 
day before the Federal Reserve announced its 
shift  to a  reserve-aggregate monetary-control 
procedure.  The second  begins on  October  8, 
1979 and ends on October 15, 1982. 
Throughout both periods, the CPI, the PPI, 
and  the  industrial  production  index  were  re- 
leased  monthly on various days of  the'week. 
The unemployment rate was usually released on 
the  first  Friday  of  each  month.  All  four in- 
dicators provide information about economic 
activity during the preceding month. 
The M1 money supply was used in monitor- 
ing the effects of  money announcements. This 
choice was  due to the importance of  M1 to 
Federal  Reserve  policy  in  the  two  periods. 
During  the  first  period,  weekly  money  an- 
nouncements  were  made  on  Thursdays. 
Throughout  most  of  the  second  period,  an- 
nouncements were  made on Fridays and also 
pertained to a redefined 
Table 1 summarizes statistics for the volatil- 
ity of data announcements and interest rates for 
the  two periods.  The first  panel of  the table 
reports the mean and the standard deviation, 
which is a measure of volatility, for the various 
measures  of  economic  a~tivity.~  Average an- 
nouncements for the measures of economic ac- 
tivity reflect business conditions in each period. 
For example, during the second period, which 
spanned  the  two  most  recent  recessions, in- 
dustrial production declined on average and the 
average unemployment rate rose 1.7 percentage 
points above the average for the first  period. 
The recent moderation in inflation is reflected 
in lower  average PPI increases in  the second 
period, while CPI increases were virtually un- 
Old MI differs from the current definition mainly in that 
it  excluded "other checkable deposits" at  depository in- 
stitutions. In  1980 and 1981 the present MI was referred to 
as MI-B. During  1981, MI-B was adjusted by  the Federal 
Reserve to reflect the introduction of nationwide NOW ac- 
counts.  Money  data  used  here  for  1981  correspond  to 
nonshift-adjusted MI-B. While the target range for shift- 
adjusted MI-B was emphasized by the Federal Reserve, the 
announced weekly changes in MI-B for this period were not 
shift adjusted. 
9 The mean of a data series Xt(t=l,  ...,  N) is defined as 
N 
Mean = %(l/~).  Z  Xt 
t=l 
The standard deviation is defined as 
N 
Standard  Devlatlon = [(IN-1) Z (x1-Ry  ] 
t=l 
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unanticipated Component$ 
M1  changes  -  .398  .201  1.584  2.154 
Percentage change in CPI  .032  -  .0111  -  ,146  .253 
Percentage change in PPI  -.W  -.W  .264  .318 
Percentage
cchange in industrial production  -  .018  -  .076  .424  .542 
unemployment rate  -  .084  -  .031  .I89  .228 
Changes" in i3;Month  Treasury Bill yields ,  -  .007  -  .022 
$8,  ,,  a  .099 ,  ,317 
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'  " 
Period61I  starts on October 6, 1979, and ends on October 15, 1982. 
L1 
?Data sources for information announcements are as follows: 
M1 =  weekly change in  the narrowly  defined money stock, in  billions of  dollars (Source:  Board  of  Governors of  the 
Federal Reserve System, H.6) 
CPI = percentage change in the consumer price index (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
PPI = percentage change in the producer price index (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Industrial  Production  =  percentage  change  in  the  industrial  production  index  (Source:  Board  of  Governors  of  the 
Federal  reserve^ System, the Federal Reserve Bulletin) 
~nemplo$megt  = percentage of labor,force"'~employed  (Source: Bureau,  of Labor Statistics) 
$Difference,between announcements'and market .expectations, wpere,expectations  are measured by the meiy,  bf the market 
survey (~guffe~~M,oney  Market Services, Inc.);'  i'.'  '  ))I  I  I'  ,  ,  , 
$Daily chdeiri  the bid quotation for the 3-libnth Prkasury bill yield in perieitgge points (Source: ~oard'bf  dbvernors of the 
Federal' Reserve System, H.  15)  s  ~ 
changed from the first period. In contrast, M1  unemployment  rate  increased  from  0.393 
increases averaged higher in the second period.  percentage points in the first period to 1.180 in 
This difference was due partly to a redefinition  the second. These figures imply that 95 percent 
of  the narrow  monetary aggregate to include 
NOW  accounts,  which  affected  announced 
money changes only in the second peri~d.'~  All  lo  For more information on the impact of NOW accounts 
series, however, were markedly more volatile in  On the monetary  aggregates  see Bryan  Higgins  and Jon 
Faust, "NOW's  and Super NOW's: Implications for Defin- 
the second  period  than  in  the  first.  For  ex-  ing  and Measuring  Money," Economic Review,  Federal 
ample,  the  standard  deviation  for  the  Reserve Bank of Kansas City, January 1983, pp. 3-18. 
8  Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City of the time the unemployment rate would be ex- 
pected to be within plus or minus 0.786 percen- 
tage points of  its first-period mean, while the 
corresponding interval in the second period in- 
creased to plus or minus 2.36 percentage points. 
These  statistics  underscore  the  increased 




While the series describing economic perfor- 
mance have shown more volatility recently, this 
rise  does  not  necessarily  imply  increased 
variability in the associated changes in interest 
rates. As discussed earlier, if all available infor- 
mation is used efficiently in determining short- 
term interest rates, rates should respond only to 
unanticipated portions of the announcements. 
Thus, in examining the rise in interest-rate 
volatility,  the  volatility of  unanticipated  an- 
nounced changes in economic data, as opposed 
to actual announced changes, should  be con- 
sidered. The second panel of Table 1 reports the 
mean and volatility of unanticipated changes in 
data  announcements.  Unanticipated  changes 
11 The survey  data used  here were collected  by  Money 
Market  Services,  Inc.,  which  surveys  about  60  money 
market participants every week. Before February 8, 1980, 
surveys  were conducted  twice a  week, on Tuesdays  and 
Thursdays. The  Thursday surveys were conducted to  obtain 
a revised estimate of expected money changes as other pro- 
spective  announcements  were  not  generally  resurveyed. 
Since  then,  the  survey  has  been  conducted  only  on 
Tuesdays. For the empirical investigation presented later in 
the paper, the survey results were adjusted in an effort to 
incorporate  any  new  information  available  from 
Tuesday-the day of  the survey-to  the day of  the an- 
nouncements. To  represent the receipt of new information, 
the change in the 3-month Treasury bill yield from Tues- 
day's close to  the closing yield the day before the announce- 
ment  was  used.  This  adjustment  was  unnecessary  for 
money announcements in the first period, as the survey date 
and announcement date coincided. We are indebted to Mr. 
Raul A. Nicho, vice president with Money Market Services, 
for making the survey data available for this project. 
are defined as the announced change, minus the 
change a survey showed market participants ex- 
pecting." As indicated in the table, the volatil- 
ity of unanticipated changes, measured by the 
root-mean-square error, which is similar to the 
standard deviation statistic,  was much greater 
in the second period than in the first." 
Volatility of  short-term interest rates 
To  the  extent  that  increased  uncertainty 
about the economy may be expected to cause 
larger movements in interest rates when new in- 
formation is received, interest rates should be 
more volatile on announcement days in the sec- 
ond period than in the first period. In turn, in- 
creased interest rate volatility on announcement 
days,  all  other  things  equal,  implies  greater 
volatility in interest rates overall. The volatility 
of  the  3-month  Treasury  bill  yield  is 
documented in Chart 1, where the root-mean- 
square error of daily changes in the Treasury 
bill yield are plotted on a monthly basis from 
September 1977 to October 1982. A marked in- 
crease in interest-rate volatility is evident after 
October 1979. Where volatility ranged from 2.6 
to 20.5  basis points in the earlier period,  the 
range for the later period was 16.6 to 56.4 basis 
l2 For the unanticipated component  of  information  an- 
nouncements defined as Xt - ~.:(t=l. ...,  N), where Xt is the 
announced information and ~tis  the median of the market 
survey, the mean and root-mean-square error are computed 
as  N 
Mean = (l/N) .X (x~x:) 
t=1 
and  N 
Root-Mean-Square Error = [(I/N). Z  (xt-xf)2]  * 
t=l 
The root-mean-square error  is  a measure of forecast ac- 
curacy,  while the standard deviation statistic reported for 
announced changes in the various  economic releases is a 
measure  of  fluctuations  around  the  average  observed 
change over a given period. As implied by the rational ex- 
pectations theory,  the  means of  the unanticipated com- 
ponents of announcements were not significantly different 
from zero. This may be seen by comparing the means with 
the respective root-mean-square errors in Table 1. 
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MONTHLY VOLATILITY OF 3-MONTH 
points, a substantial increase.I3 
This increase in interest-rate variability may 
also be seen in the last panel of Table 1. In the 
first period, the root-mean-square error of the 
daily change in the 3-month Treasury bill was 
about 10 basis points. This value rose to about 
32 basis points in the second period, more than 
three times the value in the first. 
Root Mean 
Square Error  TREASURY BILL YIELDS 
13 For the daily change in the 3-month Treasury bill yield, 
ARt(l, ...,  N), the statistics are computed as 
N 
.60  1  Pre-October 1979 
Mean = (]IN).  i  ARt 
t=I 
and  N 
Root-Mean-Square Error = [(I/N)- B (AR$  ] !4 
t=l 
It  should  be  noted  that  some "daily" changes  span 
weekends and holidays. In addition, the daily changes were 
computed for the same bill issue by adjusting for Monday 
and  Tuesday  bill  yields  generally  representing  different 
issue dates. 
Post-October 1979 
IMPACT OF UNANTICIPATED CHANGES 
IN DATA ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Summary statistics in the previous section in- 
dicated that  interest  rates  have  become more 
volatile since the Federal Reserve switched to a 
reserve-aggregate  approach  to monetary con- 
trol.  At  the  same  time,  the  volatility of  the 
unexpected component of data announcements 
also increased. If the interest-rate response to a 
surprise of  a given size remained unchanged, 
part of the rise in interest-rate volatility can be 
attributed to the increased magnitude of unan- 
ticipated changes in data announcements.  An 
additional  part  of  the  rise  in  interest-rate 
volatility may  be  due to an increased market 
reaction to a given surprise.  The relationship 
between  surprises  in  economic  releases  and 
changes in short-term interest rates was exarn- 
ined empirically to determine the relative im- 
portance of these two factors. The model used 
10  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in the empirical work is discussed next, follow- 
ed by the presentation of the estimation results. 
The model 
An efficient-markets model was used to ex: 
amine the relationship between the receipt of 
new economic information and changes in in- 
terest  rates.  The model assumes  market  par- 
ticipants use all the information available to the 
public efficiently in determining interest rates in 
the  money  market.  The  yield  on  3-month 
Treasury  bills  before  an  announcement  of 
economic data should reflect the market's  ex- 
pectation concerning the announcement. 
There are  two  primary implications of  the 
efficient-markets  model  in  this  application. 
First,  daily  changes in the 3-month Treasury 
bill yield should depend on only information in- 
vestors obtained between the closing quotations 
at the end of successive business days. As a con- 
sequence, the market's best forecast of the next 
day's closing yield is the observed yield at the 
close of the current business day. Second, any 
information obtained  after the closing quota- 
tion should influence the 3-month yield on the 
following  business  day,  but  information 
already known by  market participants should 
not. Thus, any new information obtained from 
an economic release or any announced change 
in the discount rate may affect the Treasury bill 
yield  immediately. Together,  these considera- 
tions  imply  that  daily  movements  in  the 
Treasury  bill  yield  depend  on  unanticipated 
changes in economic data releases plus a ran- 
Economic Review .  February 1983  11 dom error term." In brief,  the model  relates  With only one exception, the estimated coef- 
changes in the 3-month Treasury bill yield to  ficients for the measures of  economic activity 
the unanticipated component of  new informa-  and inflation indicate the market responses to 
tion.  surprises in announcements move in the same 
Response of Treasury bill yields 
to information in economic releases 
The model described above was used to in- 
vestigate  the  response of  short-term  interest 
rates to the release of economic information. 
Daily data were  used  in estimating responses 
both  before  and  after  the  Federal  Reserve 
changed  its  operating  procedures.  All  the 
economic data were used as originally announc- 
ed, not as they were later revised. 
The estimates reported  in Table 2 measure 
the daily change in the 3-month Treasury bill 
yield  in  response  to the  unanticipated  com- 
ponents of economic data announcements. For 
example, in the first period,  from September 
29, 1977 to October 5, 1979, a $1 billion sur- 
prise in the announced  money supply caused 
the Treasury bill yield to increase an average of 
0.016  percentage points,  or 1.6  basis points. 
The  first-period  response  to a  1  percentage 
point  surprise  in  producer  prices  caused  the 
Treasury bill yield to change an average of 2.2 
basis  points.  Response  to announcements  of 
changes  in  consumer  prices,  unemployment, 
and  industrial  production  can  be interpreted 
similarly. The coefficient corresponding to the 
discount rate measures the market's reaction to 
an  announcement  of  a  1  percentage  point 
change in the discount rate. 
direction as predicted. However, only the first- 
period response to unanticipated changes in in- 
dustrial production  had  a  statistically signifi- 
cant  effect  on  Treasury  bill  yields.15  The 
estimated response to a 1 percentage point sur- 
prise in the announced change in industrial pro- 
duction  was  a  9.5  basis  point  change in  the 
Treasury bill yield.  The response for a similar 
surprise in the second period, from October 8, 
1979 to October 15, 1982, was nearly the same 
magnitude, but it was insignificant. This result 
suggests that as reducing inflation became the 
dominant objective of economic policy, market 
participants may have placed less emphasis on 
changes in real economic activity. To the extent 
that this was true, an increase in the effect of in- 
flation surprises might be expected in the sec- 
ond period. However, inflation surprises were 
estimated  to  have  no  significant  effect  on 
Treasury bill yields in either period. 
Movements in Treasury bill yields associated 
with  releases  of  information  on  monetary 
policy  were  significant  in  both  periods.  As 
found in other studies, the market response to 
unanticipated changes in the money supply in- 
creased after the Federal Reserve changed its 
operating  procedures.16 Where  Treasury  bill 
yields moved only an average 1.6 basis points in 
response to a $1 billion surprise in the money 
supply before October 1979, the response to a 
14 Formal specification of this model is presented in Table 
2. In addition to the factors mentioned in the text, dummy 
variables were  added  to the  specification to control  for 
relative day  of the  week  effects on Treasury bill  yields. 
While  these  day  of  the  week  dummies  are  statistically 
significant as a group, their presence does not significantly 
change the qualitative results. For a discussion of day of the 
week effects, see Michael R. Gibbons and Patrick J. Hess, 
"Day of the Week Effects and Asset Returns," Journal of 
Business, October 1981, pp. 579-96. 
15 The  hypothesis  that  the  estimated  response to unan- 
ticipated  changes  in  industrial  production  was  not 
significantly different from zero could be rejected at the 10 
percent significance level, but not at the 5 percent level. For 
all other inflation and real economic activity measures, the 
same hypothesis could not be  rejected at  the  10 percent 
significance level. 
16 See,  for  example, V.  Vance  Roley, "Weekly  Money 
Supply Announcements and the Volatility of Short-Term 
Interest Rates," Economic Review,  Federal Reserve Bank 
12  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City similar surprise after that was 10.4 basis points, 
more than a sixfold increase. 
The difference in the market's  response to 
changes  in  the  discount  rate  was  equally 
dramatic." Before the change in operating pro- 
cedures, the Federal Reserve used an interest- 
rate instrument  to control  the money supply. 
Under this approach, changes in the discount 
rate would not be expected to have a direct ef- 
fect on other interest rates. Despite that fact, 
however, a change in the discount could have 
had an "announcement effect" if  the change 
was  interpreted  as  signaling  future  policy 
moves.  Results  from the first  period tend  to 
support this view. Treasury bill yields moved an 
average  of  only  about  10  basis  points  in 
response to an announced change of 1 percent- 
age point in the discount rate. After the shift to 
a reserves-based approach to monetary control, 
the market response rose to more than 50 basis 
points. The change can be attributed primarily 
to the greater importance of the discount rate in 
implementing monetary  policy under the new 
procedures.  Unlike announcements  regarding 
the basic discount rate, announced changes in 
the surcharge  rate did  not change bill  yields 
significantly. 
of Kansas City,  April 1982,  pp.  3-15.  As earlier  studies 
focused on the immediate effect of money announcements 
on interest  rates, the time interval between pre- and post- 
announcements was generally much shorter in these studies. 
One result of earlier studies was the significance of Federal 
Reserve policy ranges.  That is, market  participants were 
found to react  differently,  depending  on the announced 
money supply compared with the long-run money growth 
targets  and  whether  the  money surprise was  positive or 
negative.  With  daily  changes  in  the Treasury  bill  yield, 
however,  the  hypothesis  that  responses  to the  different 
categories of money surprises were the same could not be 
rejected at the 10  percent significance level in the second 
period. Thus, the effect of Federal  Reserve policy ranges 
was not considered further in this study. 
17 Because actual announced changes in the discount rate 
were used in the empirical investigation, such changes were 
implicitly assumed to be unanticipated. 
The market's response 
to new information 
~lthough  evidence indicates that  while  the 
change in Federal Reserve operating procedures 
prompted a much stronger market reaction to 
announcements  directly  related  to  monetary 
policy-whether changes in the money supply 
or discount rate-reactions to other announce- 
ments did not change. With only one statistical- 
ly  significant  market  response  to  an- 
nouncements  regarding  inflation,  unemploy- 
ment, and industrial production, any change in 
response  to these  announcements  cannot  be 
distinguished.  Despite  this  result,  market 
responses to all  categories of  announcements 
taken  together  differed  across  the  two 
periods.I8  As  a  consequence,  the  greater 
volatility in interest  rates over  the past  three 
years may be partly attributed to an increase in 
market  sensitivity  to new  economic informa- 
tion. 
Sources of  increased 
interest rate volatility 
Since market  responses to various types of 
announcements  were  different  after  October 
1979, the volatility of interest rates was decom- 
posed  according  to the identified  sources of 
volatility in an effort to better identify causes of 
the change.  Specifically, the  volatility of  in- 
terest  rates in the second period was  decom- 
posed to equal the volatility in the first period, 
18 The hypothesis that the market's response was the same 
in both periods for inflation, unemployment, and industrial 
production announcements cannot be rejected individually 
at the 10  percent level of significance. Similar hypotheses 
for  money  and  discount  rate announcements can  be re 
jected at significance levels well below 1  percent. The joint 
hypothesis that the market's response to  all information an- 
nouncements was the same across ~eriods  can be rejected at 
the  1  percent  significance  level.  To  avoid  problems 
associated  wtih  heteroscedasticitv.  each  of  the estimated 
equations in the test was weighted by the reciprocal of its 
estimated standard error. 
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volatility of  surprises in  the announcements, 
plus increases in volatility due to changes in the 
market's  response by the type of surprise, plus 
the change in random ~olatility.'~  The results of 
the decomposition are presented in Table 3. 
The results indicate that about 9.2 percent of 
the daily volatility of the 3-month Treasury bill 
yield after October 1979 can be attributed to in- 
creased market responsiveness to unanticipated 
changes in the money supply. Another 4.6 per- 
cent  can  be  attributed  to a  stronger  market 
reaction to changes in the basic discount rate. 
Thus, nearly 14  percent of interest-rate volatili- 
ty since October  1979 can be tied to the new 
monetary-control  procedures adopted  by  the 
Federal Reserve. 
Less  than  1  percent  of  the  interest-rate 
volatility since October 1979 can be attributed 
19 The  volatility  decomposition  can  be  represented 
analytically as 
where  ci(i = 1, ...,  7)  =  estimated  coefficients  in  the 
first period 
c;(i=  1, ...,  7)  =  estimated  coefficients  in  the 
second period 
N1.N2  =  number of  observations in the 
first  and  second  periods, 
to  increased  market  responsiveness  to  the 
release  of  other  economic  indicators. 
Moreover, the increased volatility of the unan- 
ticipated component of information announce- 
ments has had an insignificant impact on the 
variability of  short-term  interest  rates.  Thus, 
nearly  all  the  explained  volatility in  interest 
rates since the change in Federal Reserve oper- 
ating  procedures is  linked to the response to 
data related directly to monetary policy. Still, 
almost 75  percent of the interest-rate volatility 
since October 1979 has been due to an increase 
in random volatility that cannot be assigned to 
any specific cause.'O 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  relationship  between  the  rise  in  the 
volatility of short-term interest rates since late 
1979 and economic data releases shows that the 
increased response of short-term interest rates 
to weekly  money  supply announcements  has 
contributed to the rise in volatility. Just over 9 
percent  of  the  rise  in  daily  volatility  was 
estimated as  resulting from the increased re- 
sponse to these announcements alone. Another 
5 percent was  found to result from a greater 
response to changes in the discount rate.  The 
response  to  other  announcements,  including 
those relating to inflation and economic activi- 
ty, does not appear to have contributed to the 
increased volatility. Only announcements close- 
ly related to the change in money control pro- 
cedures were found to contribute significantly 
to the rise in interest-rate volatility. 
Results of  this study aIso have implications 
for the weekly  release of  information on the 
money supply. Because of  the volatility of  in- 
respectively 
S;(i = 1,. .. ,7)  =  unanticipated  component  of  .  . 
respective  infbrmation 
announcements.  20 While only a moderate amount of the rise in interest-rate 
This representation of the decomposition is exact when the  volatility  may  be  attributed  directly  to  the  change  in 
events are mutually exclusive. When only a small subset of  operating procedures,  this does not necessarily imply that 
events occur simultaneously, as is the case in this study, this  the unexplained volatility is unrelated to the change in pro- 
representation is a close approximation.  cedures. 
14  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City terest rates associated with the weekly money 
announcements, some observers have suggested 
that the Federal Reserve change the way these 
announcements are made. One suggestion has 
been that M1 information be released monthly 
instead of weekly.21  The contention is that since 
a monthly series would be less volatile and more 
easily predicted, it would not induce such large 
21 Another  proposal  is  that  the  Federal  Reserve release 
weekly money supply data in terms of moving averages. To 
the extent that these releases contained the same informa- 
tion as before,  such announcements should not affect the 
interest-rate response. See, for example, Bondweek, April 
12,  1982,  p.  4, "Street  Expects  Fed  to Drop Seasonal 
Money Adjustments,"  or Bondweek, April 26, 1982, p. 4, 
"Garn  May Ask for Monthly M1 Release If  New System 
Doesn't  Pan Out." 
movements  in  interest  rates.  This  study  in- 
dicates,  however,  that  the  greater  unpredict- 
ability  of  money  announcements  contributes 
only slightly to the overall volatility of interest 
rates. To move away from weekly reporting of 
changes  in  the  money  supply  may  reduce 
interest-rate volatility only marginally. Also, to 
the extent  that  less  direct  information  about 
Federal  Reserve  policy  was  available  to in- 
vestors,  other  announcements  might  take on 
more importance. If market participants use in- 
flation and other economic information to  infer 
the  future  course  of  Federal  Reserve  policy, 
surprises in the announcement  of  other series 
besides the money supply might induce signifi- 
cant swings in interest rates, shifting a portion 
of volatility away from money toward these an- 
nouncements. 
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